Montana Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Winter 1972

Article 1

1-1-1972

Energy in the Executive
Richard B. Roeder
Montana State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Richard B. Roeder, Energy in the Executive, 33 Mont. L. Rev. (1972).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Roeder: Energy in the Executive

ARTICLES

ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE
by Richard B. Roeder*
"Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
governjlent." Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #70
In November, 1970, Montana's electorate approved a referendum
requiring the legislature to reorganize the state's administrative agencies
into no more than twenty departments. The 1971 Legislative Assembly
passed the necessary legislation, and reorganization is now being implemented. Since this involves reform of the executive branch only so far
as statutory changes can alter it, Montana's constitutional convention
will have the opportunity to examine the issue further and perhaps
carry forward the task of reorganization when it meets early in 1972.
The executive provisions of Montana's 1889 constitution present to
today's observer what appears to be an inherent contradiction. Article
VII, section 5 invests the "supreme executive power of the state" in the
office of governor. But other executive articles are a direct denial of
this proposition because they provide for a fragmented, plural executive.
The constitution creates or recognizes seventeen executive state agencies.
In addition to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor there are five
elected officials: Attorney General, Secretary of State, Superintendent
of Public Instruction, Auditor, and Treasurer. The constitution establishes the office of State Examiner and a Department of Agriculture
and a Department of Labor and Industry. It also sets up seven Boards
and Commissions. Five of these are ex officio in make-up. Of the other
two, the State Board of Education is comprised of the Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Attorney General and eight members
appointed by the Governor, while the three members of the State Board
of Equalization are appointed by the Governor for overlapping sixyear terms.
The 1889 convention adopted most of these executive provisions
largely from the abortive constitution of 1884. This is one reason why
consideration of the executive article elicited comparatively little debate
in the 1889 convention. Another is the fact that delegates largely
agreed, indeed took for granted, what constituted a proper executive
branch of government. Most of the discussion of the report of the Committee on Executive Departments ceentered around the salaries of executive officers. When Timothy E. Collins of Cascade County tried to
reduce the Governor's salary as proposed by the Committee on the
grounds that the Governor would have little to do, he was defeated;
but no one gainsaid him when he referred to the office as an "ornament"
and a "sinecure." In fact several other delegates described the office
in similar terms without contradiction by fellow delegates. Those who
*Associate Professor of History, Montana State University, Bozeman,
Montana.
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opposed Collins were not seeking to raise the salary, as one delegate
put it, to a "princely" or "unrepublican" level; but they did want to
avoid a situation where only wealthy men could afford to hold the
office. And while those who opposed Collins might agree that the
Governor would have little to do, they also thought he would incur
considerable expense in entertaining legislators and prominent out-ofstate visitors.
Quite clearly the delegates regarded the Governor's office as largely
ceremonial, and they expected that executive matters would be handled
in routine fashion by the boards and commissions established by the
constitution. That the members of the convention could not entertain
the idea of strengthening the Governor's powers is indicated by the
discussion of a report of the Judiciary Committee dealing with pardons.
The Committee's report calls for the creation of a Board of Pardons,
composed of the Secretary of State, Auditor, and Attorney- General,
but before the report was adopted B. Platt Carpenter of Lewis and
Clark County tried to amend the report by deleting the Board of
Pardons and placing the power solely in the Governor's hands. William
W. Dixon of Silver Bow replied that a "large majority" of the Judiciary
Committee favored a Board of Pardons. Carpenter was the only delegate who spoke on behalf of his motion, and he was defeated. Very
likely William A. Clark, president of the Convention, reflected the
attitude of most delegates when he remarked that the "domain of the
one-man power and principle is rapidly narrowing down as the civilization of the century advances." He said that the idea of vesting the
power exclusively with the Governor "would strike us all with amazement." And he added, "I do not believe in putting so important a matter
in the hands of one man."1 Thus the delegates thought in terms of a
divided executive power. Given the age and the history of the office
of governor up to that time it would have been surprising if they had
thought otherwise.
This suspicion of executive power was deeply ingrained in the
minds of the delegates. In fact its roots go back to the Revolutionary
period of our history. In the thirteen years of debate that preceded.
independence, the conflict between Great Britain and the colonies was
manifested, in part, in clashes between governors, who represented
royal or proprietary authority, and the colonial assemblies which contemporaries regarded as the bastions of liberty and the voice of popular
power. As constitutions were adopted to set up state governments to
replace the old royal or proprietary governments, it is not surprising
that the constitutions reflected this clash between legislative and .exe-.
cutive power by their including institutional arrangements designed'
to limit the executive in favor of power in the legislative branch. Con1

PROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD, A HISTORY OF MO1NTANA 1805-1900,
546 (1957); Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention Held in the
City of Helena, July 4th, 1889, August 17th, 1889, at 427, 430, 442, 443, 447 (1921).
HAmLTOw,
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sequently, the governors of most of the states had less power than royal
and proprietary governors had had. In Pennsylvania, for example, the
Constitution of 1776 replaced the governor with a plural executive,
while in other states the governor's power was limited by election by
the legislature (popular election was employed only in New York) and
by depriving him of the veto power, surrounding him with an advisory
council chosen by the legislature, restricting his power of appointment,
and by limiting the length of his term of office and depriving him of
eligibility for re-election. As set up in the early state constitutions,
the office of governor was largely honorific and ceremonial. The point
is illustrated by the story of a delegate to the North Carolina constitutional convention who in response to a query about how much power
to have replied, "Just enough
the governor would have was supposed
2
to sign the receipt for his salary."1
In the first three decades of the nineteenth century the constitutions
of new states and revisions of old constitutions altered the position of
the governorship somewhat. Constitutional changes provided for popular
election, restored the veto power, and relaxed prohibitions against reelection. Though these changes gained the governor a greater independence of the legislative branch, they did not raise the office to one
of great power because they were more than counterbalanced by a
growing reliance on the long ballot. During the Age of Jackson popular
opinion regarded election of a long list of executive officials as the
answer to the spoils system and as a way of making government responsive to the wishes of the people. The effect of the long ballot was
to diffuse the governor's power. However, by mid-century it appeared
that the long ballot had not completely curbed the power of political
bosses. Consequently, constitution makers also relied on the idea of
"taking administration out of politics" by setting up numerous independent boards and commissions. This attempt to insulate policy from
politics further diminished the governorship by distributing executive
power among independent agencies and other elective officials. These
notions of what the executive should be were the ones in vogue when
Montana achieved statehood and they account for the morphology of
Montana's executive branch of government.
Administration by boards and commissions may have sufficed at a
time when the functions of state government were simple and relatively
inexpensive, when it was possible for the Board of Examiners to gather
around a table and personally examine claims against the state. But
$LipsoN, THE AMERICAN GOVERNOR FROM FIGUREHEAD TO LEADER, 14

(1939).

Addi-

tional information on the historical background of the office of governor and on
changing ideas of public administration can be gleaned from Kallenbach, THE
(1966);
AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNORSHIP
RICHARDS, THE TRADITIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE STATES,
STATES: THEIR TASKS AS POLICY MAKERS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

THE

FORTY-EIGHT

40-64; KAUFMAN,
Enmerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, (Dec. 1956).
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state government was not destined to remain so simple. In the 1890's
aid the first decades of the twentieth century the public began to make
increasing demands on government, and programs expanded rapidly in
number and size. In meeting this situation legislatures had the option
of putting new programs clearly under the governor's authority or
creating new agencies virtually independent of the governor. In most
instances they chose the latter.
Montana was no exception to this national trend of expanding
government and mushrooming agencies. In 1890 Montana's administrative machinery consisted of twenty offices, commissions, and boards.
Each decade witnessed an increase with the most rapid rate of increase
occurring in the 1890's and from 1910 to 1920. By 1920 the original
twenty offices, commissions, and boards had increased to 104. 8
This rapid growth did not go unnoticed by people at the time. The
response to this bewildering expansion of government was a reorganization movement which, with fluctuating degrees of interest and success, has continued down to the present. The reorganization movement
began at the federal level in 1910 when President William Howard Taft
appointed a Commission on Economy and Efficiency. The following
year Wisconsin set up a similar body and other states soon followed.
Montana followed suit in 1919 when the Legislative Assembly created
a State Efficiency and Trade Commission. In its report to Governor
S. V. Stewart the Commission made s e v e r a 1 recommendations for
changes, but it observed that constitutional obstacles in the form of
boards manned ex officio by elective officers were "insuperable in any
attempt to carry out a . . . scheme of reorganization. ' 4 The Efficiency
and Trade Commission report was the first of a series of governmental
studies. Partly in response to the expansion of government which resulted from New Deal programs, interest in reorganization revived in.
the 1940's and fifties.
During its 1941 session the legislature set up a Select Committee
on State Governmental Organization. In addition to make specific rec
ommendations which could be carried out largely by executive order,
the Select Committee noted that "Constitutional limitations make any
immediate complete re-organization impossible."'5 Since the Committee
could barely begin to examine the problems of state government organization in the short time available to it, the legislature responded by
creating a Governor's Committee on Reorganization and Economy to
report to the legislature in 1943. To assist it the Committee hired
Griffenhagen & Associates which produced a stack of fifty-nine reports
sSMITH, AN

OuTLInE or THE DEVELOPMENT

AND GROWTH OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

IN MONTANA, 1890-1953, table 1 (1953).
'MONTANA

STATE EFFIcIENCY AND TRADE COMMISsION, Report Rendered on November

1, 1919 to Governor S. V. Stewart, 52 (1919).
5HOUSE JOURNAL

MONTANA,

399

OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH

(1941).
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of some 1400 pages. Their 967 recommendations ranged from suggestions
on office procedure to constitutional amendments.
After World War II many states established "Little Hoover Commissions" to tackle problems of state government. Again Montana was
no exception. In 1951 the legislature established the Commission on Reorganization of State Government. Although this group refused to include proposals for constitutional amendments among its recommendations, it was critical of a system which diluted the Governor's authority.
"It is an inescapable fact," the Commission reported, "that the people
of Montana hold the Governor responsible for state administration."
Therefore, the Commission took the position "that authority must be commensurate with responsibility. Responsibility and performance are both
weakened when responsibility does not carry with it sufficient power
to accomplish the job." In this respect the Commission was particularly
critical of the operation of the Board of Examiners. It observed that
the Attorney General and the Secretary of State "have little responsibility in the public mind for administration of state affairs, but nonetheless possess the management authority."6
These efforts were followed by two organization studies by the
Legislative Council. In its 1960 report the Council was critical of Montana's long ballot and of government by boards and commissions. In
the ensuing biennium the Council continued its study of the organization
of the executive branch. Its 1962 report included specific recommendations on accounting, purchasing, and budgeting as well as a longrange plan for future work on the executive.
While the Legislative Council's efforts resulted in the adoption
of some important specific changes, it has been only in more recent
years that a more or less complete reorganization was cast. In 1969
the legislature set up a nine member Commission on Reorganization of
the Executive Branch of State Government. In its extraordinary session the legislature also submitted a constitutional amendment to the
voters which proposed that all executive functions be allocated within
not more than twenty departments by July 1, 1973. The electorate
adopted the amendment, and the Commission included in its report a
thorough plan of reorganization. The 1971 legislature passed the necessary legislation, and the reorganization contemplated by the constitutional amendment and proposed by the Commission is being implemented. Impressive as these achievements have been, they are less than
complete because they do not cover the constitutional problems studies
have been calling attention to since 1919.
In the nation as a whole the 1960's were marked by a growing
interest in reform of state governments by constitutional revision. There
6

THE CoMMIssIoN ON REORGANIZATION Or STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Report to the Thirty-third Legislative Assembly, 2 (Jan. 1953).
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are varied reasons for this widening interest in constitutional change.
In some states the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on reapportionment
provided the impetus. In states with metropolitan centers, the demands
of the urbanized and underprivileged have been a factor. Very likely
the long-term efforts of such groups as the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, the Council of State Governments, National Municipal League, and the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures have begun to elicit some response. 7 Not least important is a
growing awareness of the fact that state governments have not been
withering away as federal government expands and that effective state
governments are essential to the federal system.
It was not too many years ago that it was common to hear comments, made with willing acceptance by some and with reluctant resignation by others, about how state governments were rapidly becoming
obsolete appendages in our federal system. While it is true that the
federal government was drawn into new areas by the vacuum which
resulted from the inability or unwillingness of states to act, the fact of
the matter is that, by whatever measure employed, there has been a
rapidly growing demand for state and local government services.8 For
example, state and local government expenditures have shown sharp
increases since World War II. In 1969 state and local governments
spent "almost three times as much as total federal non-defense expenditures." As a percentage of the Gross National Product local and federal
government expenditures are revealing. Federal non-defense spending
declined from 3.8% of the GNP in 1940 to 2.3% in 1966. During the
same period state and local spending rose from 8.0% to 10.3% of the
GNP. This rising cost is also reflected in employment figures. Since
1953 "employment in state and local governments has increased at a
faster rate than employment in private industry or in the federal
government."9
There are reasons to believe that this trend of expanding state government will continue in the 1970's. Comments by public figures and
discussion in popular periodicals indicate a heightened concern for
expanding the role of state government in the federal system. President
Johnson used the phrase "creative federalism," and more recently PresiBOOK O THE STATES 1968-1969, 3 (1968).
Modernizing State Government, STATE GOVERNMENT

7THE

ADMINISTRATION,

II, 6 (Au.

gust, 1967). V. 0. Key, Jr. has commented upon the connection between obsolete
state political and constitutional institutions and the growth of federal programs
as follows: "Institutional gadgets that wear down, discourage, or defeat local majorities can only drive them to the alternative route to action through federal power ...
When the dominant mood of an era encounters institutional blockages at the state
level, the flow of effective political power is apt to result in accretions to federal
functions . . . Those persons concerned in good faith about federal centralization
might well give their attention to the effectiveness of state political systems as inV. 0. KEY, JR., AMERICAN POLITICS: AN
struments of popular government."
INTRODUCTION, 81 (1956).
OPECHMAN,

13 (1967).

FEDERAL TAx POLICY,

2, 211 (1971);
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dent Nixon used the expression "New Federalism" to refer to this new
reliance on the states. As defined by Daniel P. Moynihan, President
Nixon's Councilor on Urban Affairs, the "New Federalism" means
assigning "governmental responsibilities to that level of government most
suited to carry them out efficiently and effectively." In an address to
the 61st Annual Meeting of the National Governors' Conference on
September 1, 1969, President Nixon himself explained another aspect
of the "New Federalism." In addition to using state governments to
assist in administering federal programs, as Moynihan indicated, President Nixon also wants to involve them in setting up programs and
determining allocation of society's resources in a partnership of policy
making. 10
Governors themselves foresee a greatly expanded role for the
states in the 1970's. Governors polled by the American Society for
Public Administration envisaged a vital co-operative federalism in which
state governors will be, as one of them put it, "the key linkage between
the national government and the states." In the next decade what
another observer has called the "leadership potential of the American
Governor" may well prove to be an important key to forceful state
action.11 It is essential, therefore, that the office be freed from impediments which will prevent a realization of that potential. Fortunately,
the sixty years of reorganization studies have yielded guidelines for
evaluating the formal adequacy of the office.
The following are some of the principles of administrative organization that have emerged: (1) unity of the executive under the governor
with the elimination of "most" elective officers, (2) grouping related
functions into a few major departments with department heads appointed
by the Governor and responsible to him, (3) use of a merit system to
protect career employees from political exactions, (4) use of central
staff service and controls for such things as purchasing and record
keeping, (5) use of the executive budget and legislative post audit,
12
and (6) elimination of boards and commissions for administrative work.
'SWays, Creative Federalism and the Great Society, FORTUNE, 121-123, 223, 224-226, 228229, (Jan. 1966); Elazar, The Resurgence of Federalism, 43 STATE GOVERNMENT, 166,
173 (Summer 1966); Colman, Rhetoric or Reality?, 59 NATIONAL Civic REVIEW, 358
(July, 1970); Moynihan, The Need to Move Programs to Policy in the Federal System,
43 STATE GOVERNMENT, 226-228 (Autumn, 1970); Nixon, A New Strategy for the
1970's at Home and Overseas, 42 STATE GOVERNMENT, 206 (Autumn, 1969).
uRansome, Jr., A Symposium: The American Governor in the 1970's, 30 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 40 (Jan.-Feb., 1970); Olsen, The American Governor: Executive Management for System Change, 44 STATE GOVERNMENT, 26 (Winter, 1971).
1-These principles are summarized in MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION: REPORT NUMBER 7, 9 (1962). They are also presented in WILLBERN,
ADMINISTRATION

IN

STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

THE FORTY-EIGHT

STATES:

THEIR TASKS

114-115. While these principles are generally considered valid in the sense that their implementation will improve the operations of state government, political scientists recognize a need for empirical data
about the operation of administrative organizations. For a discussion of this need,
see Simmons, American State Executive Studies: A Suggested New Departure, THE
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, 777-783 (December, 1964).
AS POLICY MAKERS AND ADMINISTRATORS,
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With the reforms instituted in the last decade or so and with the
reorganization program now being implemented, Montana's executive
branch embodies most of these principles. In fact, the office of governor
in Montana now compares favorably with many other states. Joseph
A. Schlesinger has attempted to combine various factors for the purpose
of arriving at a general index of the formal powers of governors which
is useful for purposes of comparison. Except for his appointive power,
where he has a low rank, Montana's governor as revealed by Schlesinger's
index ranks among the top thirteen states. Some of the states whose
governors have formal powers that exceed the Montana governor are
ones which have had recent constitutional revisions or extensive administrative reforms.' 3
A four-year term and the absence of any restrictions on succeeding
himself are sources of strength for the governor's office, and most students of state government would regard these as positive aspects of
Montana's Constitution. However, there are several aspects of the governor's election that could be improved. One of these is the time of
assuming office. The governor now begins his term on the first Monday
in January following his election. Permitting the governor to take
office a month earlier would shorten the lameduck period of his predecessor and give him a month to begin familiarizing himself with his
office before the legislature convenes in January. Another aspect which
could bear re-examination is the election calendar. Montana now holds
elections at the same time as national elections. Although authorities
are not in complete agreement, holding state elections in odd numbered
years would enable the electorate to focus on state matters without
being distracted by national issues. Still another matter which cries
for attention is joint election of the governor and lieutenant governor.
As it is now, they can be of different parties. Joint election would
prevent this, would facilitate matters when the governor has to be out
of state and make for a smoother transition in the event the lieutenant
governor had to succeed the governor. Finally, there is a need to clarify
the constitution on the problems of incapacity of the governor, vacancy
of the office, and orderly succession. Ambiguities about succession and
the governor's inability to perform the duties of his office should be
removed. Arrangements similar to those in the 25th amendment to the
federal Constitution, adopted in 1967, would suffice.
There are also some aspects of the governor's role in the legislative process that might bear study. Montana's governor has a strong
veto power. It takes a two-thirds vote in both houses to override a
veto, and the governor has the item veto on appropriation bills. He can

"Schlesinger, The Politics of the Executive, POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 220-229 (1965); Ransone, Scholarly Revolt in Dullsville:
New Approaches to the Study of State Government, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW,
350-352 (December, 1966); Beyle, The Governor's Formal Powers: A View from the
Governor's Chair, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RfviEw, 540-545 (Nov.-Dee., 1968).
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also pocket veto bills after the legislature has adjourned. There are
those who advocate removing the pocket veto. Also, the governor might
be provided with an alternative either to signing a bill or using a veto
power which is infrequently overruled. This is the executive amendment
or, as it is called in New Jersey, the conditional veto whereby the governor may return a bill with suggested changes. 14 The length of time
the governor has to examine bills should be reassessed. He now has
five days while the legislature is in session and fifteen days after adjournment. The length of time varies among the states from three to
thirty days. The present governor and recent occupants of the office
would best be able to advise on this matter.
The administrative power of the governor's office could be strengthened by granting him executive reorganization powers subject to legislative review. Ever since President Herbert Hoover altered the administrative structure of the national government through executive orders
there has been interest in extending this power to state governors.
Only Alaska has embodied this power in its constitution, but several
other states grant the power in statutes similar to the Federal Reorganization Act of 1949. Moreover, some states, such as New Jersey, Hawaii,
and Alaska, supplement executive reorganization powers with a constitutional ceiling on the number of executive departments similar to
the constitutional amendment Montana's electorate adopted in 1970.
However, the main obstacles to the governor's functioning as the
state's chief administrator derive from the solution to the problem of
power which was dictated by the historical context of the period in
which Montana's Constitution was written. To avoid what William A.
Clark called the "one-man power" principle, the framers relied on government by boards and commissions. Every study of Montana's government since the report of the State Efficiency and Trade Commission
in 1919 has been critical of this practice. As the Legislative Council
pointed out in 1960, boards and commissions may be useful where quasijudicial or citizen advisory functions are involved; but "where boards
have partial or full powers of internal administration inefficiency is
sure to result. There are inherent defects in multi-member administrative control which prevent quickness and certainty of action, which
spread responsibility which ought to be definite, and which in general
hamper administrative effectiveness." Particularly irksome is the use
of overlapping terms which exceed the governor's term. As the Commission on Reorganization of State Government observed, this will
force "one Governor to live under the shadow of his predecessor and in
15
turn, cast his shadow over his successor.'
1

For a discussion of the veto see Rich, The Governor as Policy Leader, SALrNT ISSUES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, 91-94 (1961).
IMONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF STATE
GOVERNMENT: REPORT NUMBER 3, at 11; COMMISSION OF REORGANIZATION OF STATE
GOVERNMENT, REPORT TO THE THIRTY-THIRD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, at 5.
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Closely related to the reliance on boards and commissions is the
election of independent executive officers. Section 82-1301 Revised
Codes of Montana requires the Governor, among other things, "to
supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers."
Where the officers are elected it is doubtful that the governor can satisfactorily carry out this command. In so far as these officers perform
only ministerial duties a plural executive does not greatly weaken the
governor's position; but when they participate in policy formulation
or perform functions crucial to the governor's program their presence
can be disruptive, especially if there are party differences or personality
clashes.' 6
The fragmented, plural executive diffuses power but not responsibility. The testimony is almost universal that the people hold the governor responsibile for the course of action. This is only natural since
among elected officials he has the greatest degree of visibility. But
holding him responsible while other elected officials, over whom the
governor exercises little or no control, exercise power in a political
penumbra which shades them from public view is hardly fair to the
man occupying the governor's office.
Clearly the trend in recent years has been away from the plural
executive, and some states have taken steps to shorten the ballot. In
New Jersey the governor is the only popularly elected member of the
executive branch. In Hawaii the governor and lieutenant governor
are elected, while in Alaska the governor and secretary of state are on
the ballot. Organizations such as the Council of State Governments
and the National Municipal League have given the idea of a unified
executive their endorsement. The latter organization in the most recent
Version of its Model State Constitution has an executive article which
provides for the election of only the governor and gives him the power
to appoint and remove the heads of all administrative departments.
In 1967 the Committee for Econoomic Development, whose membership is drawn from some of the nation's most prominent business leaders,
published a report which called for the election of the governor and
lieutenant governor. A year later, relying heavily on the recently
adopted constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, and New Jersey the
Study Committee on Constitutional Revision and General Government
Organization reported to the National Governors' Conference a model
state executive article which limited election to the governor and
lieutenant governor.' 7
While such groups have been trying to give the idea of a unified
executive a wider currency, there is surely nothing new in it. It is,
8RANsOME,

THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR

17MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION,
(1967); REPORT TO NATIONAL

9

223-224 (1956).
STATE GOVERNMENT,

IN THE UNITED STATES,

(1968);

MODERNIZING

20-21

GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE BY THE STUDY COMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, 6. (1968).
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of course, reflected in the national Constitution. Our first effort at
constitution making for the nation, the Articles of Confederation, did
not provide for a separate executive. During the 1787 convention, however, the delegates early decided not only on a separate branch but
also on a single officer. While a few of the delegates "stood agast"
at the presidential office that emerged, most of them favored an independent and powerful office.1 s
Although not as sharply criticized as such things as the powers of
Congress, the presidential office was called into question during the
ratification struggle which followed the work of the Philadelphia convention. It was to the situation in New York, where ratification appeared
hopeless, that James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay addressed their Federalist Papers. In Federalist numbers 70 through 77
Hamilton defended the design of the president's office with observations
which sound strikingly modern. Unity, he wrote, "is conducive to energy" while a plural executive would "conceal faults, and destroy responsibility." To Hamilton energy was the essential essence of the executive:
"A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A
feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in
practice a bad government." 1 9
Despite the antiquity of the idea of a unified executive and its
wide endorsement today, any attempt to introduce energy into Montana's
executive is certain to be greeted with strong resistance. Where it has
been tried the opposition was led by elected officials, professional administrators, and some legislators. The arguments against a unified
executive are now pretty much standardized: (1) it is essential that
other executive officers be elected in order to check the governor and
to keep the executive branch "close to the people;" (2) use of independent commissions arid their employing professionally trained administartors are essential for keeping departments "out of politics'? and
providing continuity of policy; and (3) the governor will become too
powerful for the legislature to control.
The first of these contentions is based on the assumption that
"good" elected officials will check the actions of a "bad" governor.
But this proposition works both ways. As Coleman B. Ransone, Jr.
has written, "A careful selection of examples can be used to show that
there have been occasions on which it appears that a bad governor was
checked by good elected officials, or, on the other hand, where a bad

'3FAkRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 77, 79, 161
(1913); ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION, 222 (1966); BOWEN, MIRACLE'AT
PHILADELPHIA:

THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

MAY

TO SEPTEMBER

1787 (1966).
19CooKE, THE FEDERALIST,

471, 472 (1961).
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official successfully opposed a good governor and destroyed the effectiveness of a part of his program. ' 20 As for keeping the executive
close to the people, Terry Sanford, former governor of North Carolina,
argues that "in practice it simply is not so; the people barely know
the offices exist, and cannot possibly keep up with their activities and
performances." Sanford clinches his opposition to a fragmented executive with a simple analogy: "Imagine the bewilderment if the Presi21
dent's cabinet were elected by the people.
That the use of boards and commissions removes any area of state
government from politics is a myth. Whether recognized or not, all
agencies pursue some form of policy, and policy decisions are political.
As Ransone has aptly put it, "It is not a question of policy or no policy
but a question of whose policy. 2 2 Any danger of a revival of the
spoils system can be averted by a merit system to protect public employees below the rank of department heads, and it will be up to the
legislature to scrutinize the system it sets up in order to avoid the
inertia which naturally accompanies tenured bureaucracies.
Finally, rather than weakening legislative power, a strengthened
executive can make legislative oversight more effective. The fear that
an increase in executive power will diminish legislative power is based
on the assumption that power is finite, and that when more is added to
one branch it must be taken from the other. But this is not the case.
As the Legislative Council noted, adding power to one can actually increase the effectiveness of the other, and Sanford similarly observed
that the "unhampered governor, far from restraining the legislatures,
will open to them new channels of legislative strength and effectiveness."=
Control over the governor must come from without not from
within the executive branch. The primary source of control is popular
election. The effectiveness of this, in turn, will be enhanced if a strong
party system functions to criticize and to offer alternatives. The other
source of control must be a strengthened legislature. In fact, reform
of the executive cannot be undertaken apart from reforms which will
make the legislature more effective.
The nineteenth century solution to the ever-present problem of
power was to fragment it so completely as effectively to deny the governor power. This solution threw out the baby with the bath water.
What prevents the governor from doing great wrong must also limit
his power to do great good. If the "New Federalism" is going to work,
we need state governments that can act effectively. But we must remember that constitutional changes are not panaceas. They can help
mRansome, supra note 16 at 372.
'aSANFORD,

STORM OVER THE STATEs,

'"Ransome, supra note 16 at 381.
nSanford, supra note 21 at 184.
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us wrestle with future problems by removing impediments to action,
but they cannot be a substitute for leadership. As Leslie Lipson has
written,
Reform of the executive article cannot assure that the governor will
exercise creative leadership, but it will free him to be the leader he
can be.
The ultimate solution lies beyond the scope of mere institutional
reform. Provisions of law can ordain hierarchies and confer authority. But true leadership, which inspires the willing confidence of
men, cannot be crystallized into constitutional grants of power. Each
governor must win it anew."
Finally, a simpler executive article can be part of making the constitution what it ought to be, namely fundamental law and not a code.
The distinction was put very ably by Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo:
Statutes are designed to meet the fugitive exigencies of the hour.
Amendment is easy as the exigencies change. . . A constitution
states . . . not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that standard, and
descends into details and particulars, it loses its flexibility, the
scope of interpretation contracts, the meaning hardens. While it is
true to its function, it maintains its power of adaptation, its suppleness, its play.'

"Lipson, The American Governor, supra note 2 at 268.
'CoRDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 83-84 (1921).
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